Spiritual literacy and tacit knowledge by Taggart, Geoff







This paper represents a critique of the “spiritual literacy” approach to spiritual education developed by Andrew Wright (eg, 2000a), with particular reference to the inclusion of Michael Polanyi’s theory of “tacit knowledge”. Wright’s assessment of the current state of religious education is summarised and his proposed method is outlined. Polanyi’s ideas are then described and assessed for their compatibility with the “spiritual literacy” approach. 

Wright’s analysis of religious education

As the exclusive, dogmatic form of religious education retreats to the private sector of education,  Wright looks critically at the inclusive, liberal forms  which have taken their place, such as the phenomenological and experiential approach. These approaches are labelled “experiential-expressive” in that they see a religion as best represented by the practices and experiences of its adherents. For example, the phenomenological approach while focussing ostensibly upon the phenomenon of religious culture, does so in order to lead students into an empathetic relationship with it's representatives. In the experiential approach, (eg, Hammond et al, 1991) the emphasis moves away from religious culture altogether and  towards the cultivation of the  implicit, spiritual awareness which is considered to underpin it.
The charge levelled at these educational methods is that they do not address the truth-claims which religions embody. They misrepresent religious people by suggesting that the essence of their faith is their personal religious experience rather than the beliefs they hold and which they live their lives by. The core of Wright's scholarship has been the analysis of the philosophical traditions lying behind these liberal pedagogies.  He makes clear that the "experiential-expressive" interpretation of religion arose because it fitted a certain  modern world-view. This world-view has a number of aspects, such as a dualistic separation between an external world of facts ( Kant's "phenomena") and an internal world of values ("noumena") Scientific knowledge alone has come to be  associated with objective fact.
Wright sees the origins of the experiential-expressive tradition in the philosophies of Romanticism, the original, counter-cultural opposition to this modern world-view. Yet Romanticism, according to Wright, simply reverses the order of priority so that  the subjective take precedence over the objective. 
At the height of the Romantic period, language itself reflected this split. In a logical and propositional form, it could describe the world. In a poetic or religious mode, it could not. Poetry, according to Wordsworth, was simply, "the overflow of powerful feelings", the visible marker of the ecstatic contact between subject and object. Similarly, religious language had the sole function of expressing a prior and interior, transcendent truth which the speaker had discovered. This truth was to be found in a non-dualist communication with God or with nature. In this case, words were always insufficient. 
Wright argues that contemporary developments towards "postmodernism" represent a reformulation of this Romantic world-view, albeit in a radicalised way. In holding science and technology to account, post-modern writers such as Lyotard (1984)  share the sympathies, if not the ear for language, of William Blake. However, if science has no monopoly on revealed truth, neither does poetry. Whilst the Romantic would claim that language expresses an experience of contact with what is transcendent or primal, the post-modernist recognises that these signs of "presence" are not foundational but are a cunning illusion wrought by language itself. The world view conferred  by post-modernism is one in which authenticity is not granted by some transcendent reality. Because all statements are contingent and bound by context, authenticity is something created for oneself. 
This shift in philosophical climate has had a profound impact on religious education. Romanticism and postmodernism both  have  their  "experiential-expressive"  pedagogies which religious education draws upon. For example, the educational ideas of Romanticism constitute the birth of the progressive ideal. Rousseau's Emile asserted that "Nature would have children children before they are men ... ... Childhood has its own ways of seeing, thinking and feeling; nothing is more foolish than to try and substitute our ways." This notion of a distinct culture of childhood provided inspiration  for  progressive educators such as Froebel and Montessori for whom the nurture of children's growth and their protection from the excesses of modernity was paramount. Child development neatly fitted in with progressivism and provided the backbone of theory.   As a Piagetian, Goldman (1965) drew upon the progressive legacy in seeing the purpose of religious education as the sensitisation of children to religious culture in the style most suited to their cognitive stage.  Rather than intellectual understanding of a religion’s claims to truth, internal sensitivity was the goal. Children would hopefully then bring this to the phenomenological study of religions.
Post-modernism, according to Wright,  takes this romanticism  a step further. He argues that post-modernism radicalises Romantic attitudes to children by relativising the truth which education may supposedly reveal to them. In flirting with post-modernism, spiritual education “has fallen into the trap of abandoning them  to the postmodern game of personal reality creation.” (Wright, 1997b) Religious education, in this milieu, simply celebrates subjective sensibility without reference to questions of truth. Wright is therefore especially critical of such post-modern developments as the Children and Worldviews Project (Erricker et al , 1997) which seeks to identify the self-created, "enabling metaphors" that children hold, rather than to introduce them to more consensual ones. 




Wright's proposed solution is that religious education should focus less upon the development of personal qualities and more upon the examination of religious truth-claims.  This opens up a need for  philosophical basis with one key requirement:  it has to accept  truth as something which can be realistically known without being narrow and dogmatic. Alternatively, it has to accept the insight that our knowledge is partial and contingent without rejecting a realist notion of truth altogether.  For this purpose, Wright draws on the tradition of “critical realism” . Typifying the orientation  of such philosphers as Roy  Bhaskar (1993),  this takes the view that whilst language and culture have a powerful influence upon us, we can nevertheless perceive an objective reality “out there” by use of a “contingent rationality”.
Empathy, as an objective in religious education, is irrelevant.  Extending empathy to people who hold particular beliefs closes down the transformative possibilities within them. As Wright (1997a) explains, "The important thing is to be aware of one's own bias, so that the text may present itself in all its newness and thus be able to assert its own truth against one's own fore-meanings." To achieve understanding in this sense is less about walking in somebody else's shoes and more about responding critically to what they are saying.
Wright sees a parallel between this objective and the proposed objective for education set out by Paul Hirst in the 1960’s.  This was, quite simply, that education, rather than transmitting cultural norms or following the interests of the child, should give pupils the skills to acquire knowledge via sustained contact via the forms  in which it is found. In his seminal argument (Hirst, 1965) Hirst proposed that these forms are identifiable in terms of distinctive concepts and truth criteria. Each form  has its own way of approaching its subject and its way of understanding it.   These forms, deriving from Platonic rationalism,  cultivate the force of reason which orders and shapes the other human faculties.  Wright (2000a:67) argues that adopting Hirst’s educational theory would have made possible  “the development of a critical education capable of transcending the inclusive-exclusive divide by enabling pupils to grapple at first hand with the complex issues surrounding spirituality … Such a critical spiritual education would allow pupils to engage intelligently with the ambiguous claims and counter-claims surrounding questions of ultimate truth and meaning.”
The ability to engage intelligently is the undisputed goal. “The criteria for being religiously educated needs to shift from that of an enhanced competency to feel to that of an informed ability to engage in religious dialogue.” (Wright, 1996a) Pupils have to  “engage with spiritual questions in an informed, sensitive and intelligent manner “ (Wright, 2001b) Wright envisages that “a  critical religious education will allow children to sit at the feet of traditionalist Christians, radical Christians and advocates of a postmodern deconstruction and learn to be intelligent about all three, and about their own response to the various truth claims involved” ( Wright, 2000c) 




Polanyi  could perhaps be seen as a critical realist in that he contends that “the quest for knowledge clearly entails the assumptions that there is a world to be known and that we can trust our ability to come to know it, at least partially and usefully" (Polanyi, 1958: 60) Yet this is not to say that all that can be known can be expressed, since Polanyi proposes “to  reconsider human knowledge by starting from the fact that we can know more than we can tell.”  (Polanyi, 1967: 4) This is obvious from occasions when we discover, in spite of ourselves,  that we “know” how to swim or ride a bike when we didn’t before. We may  intuitively recognise someone but not know how we know that this is someone familiar.  
In a useful schematic ( see fig 1) Gill (2000) shows how this tacit element fits into the overall dynamics of cognitive experience, as described by Polanyi. Experience can be understood in terms of  two  simultaneous, interpenetrating dimensions, the first of which is awareness.  A whole field of awareness is open to us, yet we tend to highlight one part of it at a time.  Hammering in nails, we attend to the hammer striking the nail, not the handle recoiling against our hand.  The pianist attends to the music, not her fingers touching the keys. In these cases, the object in the forefront of attention is focal, whilst the surrounding environment is subsidiary.   Polanyi argues that the world does not come to us in a flat , one-dimensional fashion but is arranged in levels  of meaning, with each level as a subsidiary context for the next.  Giving various examples of different systems, he shows that the principles embodied in each system have the capacity to produce unpredictable forms of variety and novelty. Games can be understood in terms of rules and language in terms of grammar but each has the capacity for originality. This originality cannot be explained simply in terms of the rules but it is nevertheless dependent on them.   In Polanyi’s words, we must attend from the rules of the game to the attainment of the objective or attend from the structure of language to the poetic meaning we are trying to create. 
The second dimension concerns activity.  Whereas, in the case of awareness, the dynamic is between focal and subsidiary poles, in this case, it is between bodily and conceptual poles.   To explain how the body is involved in conceptual knowledge, Polanyi refers approvingly to the genetic epistemology of Piaget as an account of how Kantian categories of time, space and causality are built up through an active process of interaction with the world. 
This stage theory sees abstract, propositional knowledge arising out of earler, concrete, sensori-motor knowledge.  



















Because of this tacit element,  it is not possible to give an exhaustive account of what one knows  without diminishing its meaning since this element is “logically unspecifiable.”  The knowledge of a surgeon, Polanyi tells us, is “ineffable knowledge” since she has assimilated and integrated a comprehensive understanding of anatomy and biology which allows for instinctive and intuitive action.  This kind of knowledge  is accomplished through what Polanyi  calls “indwelling”, the process of immersing oneself in the particulars of subisdiary awareness via embodied activity until these particulars come together as a meaningful whole.  It   plays a key role in creativity and discovery since   automated routines of practice and technique often give rise to a novel creation which cannot be fully explained by its creator.  Psychologists (eg, Claxton, 1997) see this as evidence of the “cognitive unconscious” at work,  continually adapting to new stimuli beneath the level of conscious attention. Significantly, this kind of tacit, instinctive approach to problems, in which attention is more diffuse,  is often more productive than a conceptual, discursive approach in which attention is tightly focussed.  

Spiritual literacy and tacit knowledge

It is important to indicate that  “spiritual literacy”  represents a valuable and worthy attempt to provide an alternative to the hermeneutical position abbreviated by the term “post-modernism”.  Echoing critics such as Eagleton (1996), Wright asserts that “so long as there are those who fail to buy into the post-modern story then the political, economic and technological power structures of late capitalist society will remain firmly entrenched within the fabric of society. As a result the post-modern freedom from constraint constitutes a power vacuum vulnerable to manipulation by the entertainment, leisure and communication industries “ (Wright, 1996b)







Perhaps the most obvious difference between Wright and Polanyi is Wright’s insistence that the intellgence he values arises exclusively out of our capacity for language, the key feature of the conscious, rational mind.  Polanyi is emphatic that “the establishment of truth becomes decisively dependent on a set of personal critieria of our own which cannot be formally defined.” (Polanyi, 1958: 71) Nevertheless, the main thrust of Wright’s program is articulating truth-claims and making the implicit explicit.   The suggestion is that we understand all of our experience when it is put into words. As he expresses it, "raw experience inevitably imposes itself upon us; however, an appropriation of its meaning is dependent upon linguistic refinement." (Wright,1996a) It is difficult to avoid seeing this as an assertion of pure rationalism, that we understand the world only by imposing language upon inchoate experience.  We can see this as contradicting Polanyi in two ways.
Firstly, like Dewey and Piaget, Polanyi has a naturalistic view of language as something that is primarly intentional and purposive, arising out of our actions in the world.  It expresses and shapes our lives as 3D creatures. Words such as “this” and “that”, “here” and “there” are, first and foremost, spatial concepts denoting relative positions.  “We must realise”, he advises, “ that to use language is a perfomance of the same kind as our integration of visual clues for perceiving an object, or as the viewing of a stereo picture, or our integration of muscular contractions in walking or driving a car, or as the conducting of a game of chess – all of which are performed by relying on our subsidiary awareness of some things for the purpose of attending focally to a matter on which they bear (Polanyi, 1969: 196) When we read, we are subisidiarily aware of the typeface and the language we are reading. We attend from these things in order to grasp a meaning. Polanyi, being bilingual, talks about having to check the language in which a letter is written before giving it to someone else to read.








Wright’s claims to base his pedagogy upon a “holistic conception of knowledge-as-wisdom” (Wright, 1996b) is seriously undermined by his suspicion of feeling as a mode of knowledge.  His chief concern is about the supposed drift of postmodern culture towards a hedonistic relativism where “feeling good” has become a paramount concern.   Wright agrees, some of the time, that the split between feeling and thought needs to be transcended. However he also condemns the postmodernists with the assertion that "the freedom to feel can be no substitute for the freedom to understand"  (1996a ), thus, by definition,  separating emotions from true knowledge.  This Platonic rationalism, underpinning the “objectivity” of Enlightenment science, is a key concern of Polanyi who seeks to reveal the inescapable aesthetic component in discovery. He points out that “The afffirmation of a great scientific theory is in part an expresssion of delight. The theory has an inarticulate component acclaiming its beauty, and this is essential to the belief that the theory is true.”
In addition, psychology can again be seen to corroborate philosophy in that recent neuroscience reveals  how the processing of emotions is inseparable from the reasoning of the brain.(Le Doux, 1998)

4.) Origins of intelligence

Perhaps the strongest unease generated by the proposed program concerns its completely formal, non-developmental view of intelligence.  Primary school children are clearly not Wright’s concern yet, granting this, intellgence is nevertheless seen as uniformly linguistic, rationalist and disembodied.  This is clear in his  methodology which revolves entirely around the exhaustive examination and articulation of truth-claims.  




Wright admits that “the basic concern is with the consolidation and refinement of liberalism”  ( Wright, 2000c) Liberalism should not be advanced as an ideal in itself but as an “interim ethic” (Wright, 2001a) which can consider non-liberal views without resorting to repression. He proposes that religious texts with an imperialistic intention, rather than being withdrawn, as Hull (1998) suggests, should be presented for analysis alongside all other views.  This presupposes, in rather un-Polanyian fashion, that beliefs are always arrived at completely rationally, rather than being influenced by subconscious desire.  The “political, economic and technological power structures of late capitalist society” (Wright, 1996b) which underpin religious imperialism are not considered to reach into the  individual consciousness. Reason is apparently immune to self-deception and is able to survey all views with disinterest and clarity, using cultivated discernment to arrive at what is right and true.
The “spiritual literacy”  method therefore requires that learners to emphasise the aspects of their faith that can be rationally stated in doctrine. Whilst  the phenomenological approach understands  that different religions are recognised more or less strongly in different characteristics ( doctrinal, mythological, ethical, ritual, experiential and social),  Wright’s emphasis upon doctrinal aspects, while resisting the infiltration of “new age” vagaries (Wright, 2000b) , is at the expense of the other dimensions. The result is that non-religious students are encouraged to see all religions through the same lens and religious students are obliged to represent their faith in the same form, ignoring the way in which it may manifest and have meaning in their lives in terms of rituals and practices that they “indwell”.  In the liberal position,  the taking-up of new beliefs is simply a matter of rationally selecting the best proposition rather than a “transforming moment” (Loder, 1981)  involving feelings. It is not surprising that the only chance for inter-religious dialogue is seen in terms of an intellectual forum in which the life-world of believers is excluded. 
The tendency within liberalism to work within a very narrow understanding of reason draws objections from Polanyi. His response to J.S. Mill is that  liberalism works partially, “by exalting what we can know and prove, while covering up with ambiguous utterances all that we know and cannot prove.” (Polanyi, 1958:286) This kind of conceptual reason, which Wright approves of in Paul Hirst, has recently been re-assessed by Hirst himself (1998:18). He asserts that “what is rational is what is successful in experience. Having a reason for an action is, thus,  the product  of practical experience in which we discover and develop both our needs and their satisfactions. .. social practices and practical reason are the fundamental concerns of education, not propositional knowledge and theoretical reason.” In the same vein, Polanyi  proposes that there is a “diffuse emotional conviviality” which underpins our articulate communication and which reveals itself in our common experiences of compassion and revulsion. It is perhaps this conviviality, arising out of mutual, shared experience,  which has as much to offer the cause of inter-faith harmony as structured debate.

Conclusion : Spirituality and metaphor

Wright does recognise that education can strive after “ the truth inherent in the order of things, a truth always beyond the capacity of human beings to grasp completely.”  (Wright, 2001b) In statements such as this, there seems to be an acknowledgment that spirituality involves an element of mystery. Polanyi’s suspicion of “unbridled lucidity” and his insistence that some things are “logically unspecifiable” would seem to support such a view.  This is the way in which Zigler (2000) sees the significance of Polanyi for spiritual education.  If spirituality is taken to mean the sense of ourselves within the largest whole, this whole can never be brought fully into focal awareness because certain aspects will always be subsidiary. In learning, we are not only concerned with what the mentor-teacher says or does. The awareness of the being of the teacher, a subsidiary element for the adult, is more often the focal element for the young child.  To cultivate and transmit the sense of spirituality as a holistic quality therefore involves human contact of an “I-Thou” character. 
The implied or implicit meaning within our communication may be as important or even more important than the explicit communication itself. 
With this in mind,  Polanyi’s philosophy gives an important educational  value to metaphor. He recognises that simple, concrete words can have multiple levels of meaning in  that we grasp the more comprehensive dimensions of experience by attending from the less rich and comprehensive. Jerry Gill (2000) gives the example  of a statement on a piece of paper ; it is understood first of all as physical marks, then as writing, then as a particular language, then as a concpetual meaning. In the same way, metaphors exceed the physical conditions that initially generate them. Understanding what “the bread of life” means  involves drawing on our experience of eating bread but also its significance as a global food. Polanyi (1975), like Ricoeur, argues that metaphors are not reducible to propositional statements without a loss of meaning.  At one point, Wright (1996b) agrees “that metaphor is a necessary vehicle for human understanding and that such language is irreducible to mere ostensive definition.”  However, it is difficult to see how this view can be reconciled with his proposed method.  It is not clear how a  student who advanced the truth-claim that “Jesus is the Bread of Life” would not immediately be asked to “unpack” the statement and reduce it to propositional terms.  
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